[sldev] Idea: Make GPG signatures work
Dale Glass
dale at daleglass.net
Fri Mar 30 15:36:27 PDT 2007
I see that a few people, LL employees included, are using GPG
signatures. Unfortunately as things are right now, this isn't very
useful, as the web of trust is too small for people to find a trust
path to another. So signatures work as a checksum and little else.
I propose a way this could be fixed:
1. LL has to set up a company official key, sign the keys of all
employees, and publish the public key. That wouldn't be too hard to
do, and would help already.
2. LL could also set up a scheme where it's possible to get your key
automatically signed by a LL one. This could be done from the SL
website.
Idea of how such a thing would work:
LL's own keys would be available at the website, as well as
distributed with the viewer. A wide distribution should make it very
unlikely that the keys can be falsified, and if LL gets them signed
by a few well known people it could go a long way. I went to a key
signing party at a spanish Linux meeting, and now I can trace a trust
path to keys like Richard Stallman's and the one used by the kernel
archive.
Add a "key signing" page to the profile. The user would be able to
upload their key there, and have it signed by a LL one. Knowing the
password for the account would prove their identity.
To ensure that it's not possible to just sign any key at all, a
requirement for signing would be that the name on the key must match
the avatar's name.
If there are any additional names on the key, require them to match
the real name from the profile. For this it should probably only pass
the check if there's used payment data (assuming such a thing
confirms that the name specified in the account is accurate).
Different keys could be used to specify how much LL knows about the
particular person. Keys for "This key belongs to the avatar it
says", "payment info on file", "payment info used" and "authorized
contributor who signed the agreement" and "LL employee" come to mind.
Why do this?
The first reason is to make signatures useful. People are signing
messages now, so obviously there's some interest in it. However,
there's effectively no security right now. Getting security without
LL's help would be difficult and require a key signing party, which
isn't easy at all to organize.
It would make it possible for other people to easily verify the
identity of somebody else. For instance, this would make it easy to
recognize whether a patch is made by an authorized contributor --
simply require the patch to be signed, check that the signature is
correct, and that there's an "authorized contributor" signature on
the submitter's key.
This could also be used as a base for plugin signing. If an user
decides to stick to using only signed plugins, it would be quite
unlikely that they'd end up with something nasty, such as a password
or L$ stealing plugin, and if they did then that'd make it trivially
possible to trace it back to the source.
As an additional benefit, it would make it possible to have sites in
the style of addons.mozilla.org, which mirror plugins, without
security issues. If the author signs it, then mirroring of their
plugin on various websites can be done safely.
How does this sound?
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